迪比什：等待达赖喇嘛（对自焚）的意见
英国布里斯托大学政治学博士、威斯敏斯特大学（Westminster University）副教授迪比什（Dibyesh Anand）10月19日在英国《卫报》撰文《China fears the living Tibetans – not those who set fire to themselves》（原标题：中国担心活着的藏人，而不是自焚的逝者）
自焚抗议是西藏的一个新现象。几乎每天都传出青年自焚的故事，抗议中国政府的严厉的政策和实践。 不幸的是，无论是中国政府和西藏流亡领导人，面对这一人类悲剧，只是相互指责。
西藏流亡政府以及活动家们将自焚归咎中国统治的压迫本质，藏人没有其他选择，只能牺牲自己的生命，向世界控诉他们的痛苦。中国政府指责达赖喇嘛和流亡藏人，称他们鼓励这种形式的抗议，破坏中国稳定，并骗取国际同情。这种相互指责的政治游戏，充斥着陈旧的对抗性词汇，自1959年以来，一直成为汉藏关系的标志，到目前为止未能取得任何进展。这种模式无法解决眼前的即时危机——藏人拷贝自焚行动，生命无辜流失。
事实上，西藏问题回到国际新闻头条，印度和西方的流亡藏人闻风而动，声援自焚的抗议藏人；这表明这些行动已经有一些影响。但是，它们付出了什么代价呢？ 难道西藏境内的藏人的关键需求——达赖喇嘛回归，藏人得到尊严——更接近开花结果吗？
自焚不是一种非暴力行为。 事实上，这是对自己的暴力。 伤害一个人自己的肉体不合情理，也与绝大多数佛教诠释相悖。这当然违背了达赖喇嘛和其他藏传佛教人士的辛勤工作，将藏传佛教及其身份等同于非暴力。虽然暴力，与非暴力一样，一直是西藏历史和文化的重要组成部分，十四世达赖喇嘛将西藏事业与非暴力理念成功地关联在一起。如果这种新的政治抗议形式象野火一样蔓延开来，他一生的工作难道不是白费了吗？面对青年人自杀，没有任何社区能够保持耐心；而耐心是非暴力抵抗的要求之一。
集体政治，尤其是在紧张时期和面临镇压的情况下，往往会迅速激进化；当个人感觉到压力，希望以某种具体方式表现自我。妥协成为一个坏词。当爱国主义和对达赖喇嘛的忠诚度表现为自焚以抗议中国统治，未来会有更多藏人失去生命。这对西藏事业有何帮助呢？
国际媒体很快就会失去兴趣，重复死亡没有新闻价值的（“有什么新的？”），没有哪个强大的外国政府对摇晃中国船感兴趣。随着本国正在发生的经济危机，以及西亚和北非发生的重大变化，揭露西方政府对民主和人权的虚伪；如果你认为会有更多压力施加在中国身上，那就太天真了。 在任何情况下，中国政府关注的主要是国内人民的感受。 鉴于对信息几乎全部进行审查，以及在全国广泛存在的汉族沙文主义，在很多中国人的印象中，藏族只不过是张狂的小弟弟，应该由更加先进的汉族大哥来照顾；藏人自焚事件无法将几千万被边缘化的少数民族团结起来。事实上，中国政府将得到一个机会，把藏人塑造成为不理性的宗教狂热分子。 西藏运动得到国际社会的关注的胜利将被证明得不偿失。因此，流亡领导面临困境，他们有两个选择。
利用这一抗议活动，以恢复世界各地的藏人和他们的支持者的活力，即使这意味着间接鼓励在中国境内已经遭受苦难的藏族青年的壮烈牺牲。或者，突出在中国境内的藏人受到的持续压迫；同时公开和私下里做工作，呼吁当地的藏人，为了民族的生存，要珍惜自己的生命。迄今为止，流亡政府总理洛桑森格领导下的新的政治领导层选择了前者。如此，它需要解决这一牺牲个人生命的斗争形式与达赖喇嘛中间道路的承诺之间的脱节；中间道路使用非暴力手段，寻求藏人在中华人民共和国内实施真正自治。
然而，流亡的宗教领袖必须站出来。他们应该选择第二个选项。藏传佛教第三大高级喇嘛噶玛巴，已经表达了他对政治自杀的不安。其他一些喇嘛也表达了他们的忧虑。但我们仍在等待达赖喇嘛的意见。他会同意目前政治领导层，采取声援自焚藏人的策略吗？还是会采取一个不太受欢迎，但与佛教理论兼容的立场，要求在中国境内的藏人不要一味自焚呢？ 在所有人中间，他最了解，中国不怕死亡或奄奄一息的僧人；它害怕活着的藏人。
China fears the living Tibetans – not those who set fire to themselves
The eyes of the international media may be on Tibet once again, but this wave of self-immolation will not help its people
Protest by self-immolation is a new phenomenon in Tibet. Stories of young people burning themselves in protest against the draconian policies and practices of the Chinese government are coming out of the country on almost a daily basis. Unfortunately, both the Chinese government and the Tibetan leaders in exile are responding to this human tragedy solely in terms of a blame game.
The Tibetan exile government as well as the activists ascribe self-immolations to the repressive nature of the Chinese rule that leaves Tibetans with no other option but to sacrifice their lives to remind the world of their pain. The Chinese government blames the Dalai Lama and the exiles for encouraging this form of protest to create more instability inside China and generate international sympathy. This politics of blame marshals the same old adversarial vocabulary that has been the hallmark of Sino-Tibetan relations since 1959 and has failed to achieve any accommodation so far. It certainly falls short of addressing the immediate crisis in hand – the loss of human lives due to the copycat phenomenon of self-immolation.
The fact that Tibet is back in the international news and the exiles in India and the west are galvanising their movement in solidarity with the self-immolating protesters indicates that the acts are already having some impact. But at what cost? Does any of this make the key demand of Tibetans inside Tibet – the return of the Dalai Lama and the right to be treated with dignity – closer to fruition?
Self-immolation is not nonviolent. It is, in fact, a violence against oneself. Harming one's own corporeal being is unjustifiable and goes against most interpretations of Buddhism. It certainly goes against the hard work put by the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan religious figures to equate Tibetan Buddhism and identity with nonviolence. Though violence, as much as nonviolence, was always part and parcel of Tibetan history and culture, the 14th Dalai Lama has been singularly successful in associating the Tibet cause with nonviolence. Won't his lifetime's work go waste if this novel form of political protest spreads like a wildfire? No community can exercise patience, something that nonviolent resistance demands, in the face of young men killing themselves.
Collective politics, especially at times of stress and in a context of repression, tends to become rapidly radicalised as individuals feel the pressure to perform in specific ways. Compromise becomes a bad word. And as the performance of patriotism and loyalty toward the Dalai Lama become associated with immolating oneself to protest against the Chinese rule, more Tibetan lives will be lost in the coming days. How does that benefit the Tibetan cause?
International media will soon lose interest for the repetitive deaths are not newsworthy ("what's new?") and there is no powerful foreign government interested in rocking the Chinese boat. With the ongoing economic crisis at home and major changes in west Asia and north Africa that are exposing western government's hypocrisy toward democracy and human rights, it is naive to believe that any additional pressure would be applied on China. In any case, the Chinese government's main concern is what people within China feel. Given the almost total censorship of information in the country as well as the widespread Han chauvinism that perceives Tibetans as insolent younger brothers to be taken care of by the more progressive Han Chinese majority, self-immolations will not bring about solidarity with the tens of millions of marginalised Chinese. In fact, the Chinese government will get an opportunity to portray Tibetans as religious fanatics who cannot be reasoned with. The victory of the Tibetan movement in terms of getting international attention will prove to be pyrrhic.
So the exile leadership faces a dilemma and has two options.
Should it use the protests to rejuvenate Tibetans and their supporters all over the world, even if it means indirectly encouraging the attractiveness of this heroic sacrifice for the already-suffering young Tibetans inside China? Or should it highlight the continuing oppression of Tibetans inside China but at the same time discourage self-immolation by publicly calling for, and privately working for, the Tibetans in the affected region to treasure their lives for the survival of the nation? The new political leadership underLobsang Sangay, the prime minister of the government in exile, has so far been to go for the first option.
But it needs to address the disjuncture between the commitment to the middle way of the Dalai Lama (which entails genuine autonomy for the Tibetans within the People's Republic of China and struggle to seek that through nonviolent means) and the actual reality of a struggle where individual lives are being sacrificed.
However, it is the religious leaders in exile who must take the initiative here. It is they who should go for the second option. The Karmapa, the third highest lama in Tibetan Buddhist hierarchy, has expressed his discomfort with political suicides. Other individual lamas too have expressed their disquiet. But we are still waiting for the Dalai Lama to make his views known on this. Will he go with the political leadership's strategy of solidarity with self-immolation or will he adopt a less popular but religiously compatible stance of requesting the Tibetans inside China not to indulge in self-immolation? Of all the people, he knows best that China does not fear the dead or the dying monks. It fears the living ones.
自焚抗议是西藏的一个新现象。几乎每天都传出青年自焚的故事，抗议中国政府的严厉的政策和实践。 不幸的是，无论是中国政府和西藏流亡领导人，面对这一人类悲剧，只是相互指责。
西藏流亡政府以及活动家们将自焚归咎中国统治的压迫本质，藏人没有其他选择，只能牺牲自己的生命，向世界控诉他们的痛苦。中国政府指责达赖喇嘛和流亡藏人，称他们鼓励这种形式的抗议，破坏中国稳定，并骗取国际同情。这种相互指责的政治游戏，充斥着陈旧的对抗性词汇，自1959年以来，一直成为汉藏关系的标志，到目前为止未能取得任何进展。这种模式无法解决眼前的即时危机——藏人拷贝自焚行动，生命无辜流失。
事实上，西藏问题回到国际新闻头条，印度和西方的流亡藏人闻风而动，声援自焚的抗议藏人；这表明这些行动已经有一些影响。但是，它们付出了什么代价呢？ 难道西藏境内的藏人的关键需求——达赖喇嘛回归，藏人得到尊严——更接近开花结果吗？
自焚不是一种非暴力行为。 事实上，这是对自己的暴力。 伤害一个人自己的肉体不合情理，也与绝大多数佛教诠释相悖。这当然违背了达赖喇嘛和其他藏传佛教人士的辛勤工作，将藏传佛教及其身份等同于非暴力。虽然暴力，与非暴力一样，一直是西藏历史和文化的重要组成部分，十四世达赖喇嘛将西藏事业与非暴力理念成功地关联在一起。如果这种新的政治抗议形式象野火一样蔓延开来，他一生的工作难道不是白费了吗？面对青年人自杀，没有任何社区能够保持耐心；而耐心是非暴力抵抗的要求之一。
集体政治，尤其是在紧张时期和面临镇压的情况下，往往会迅速激进化；当个人感觉到压力，希望以某种具体方式表现自我。妥协成为一个坏词。当爱国主义和对达赖喇嘛的忠诚度表现为自焚以抗议中国统治，未来会有更多藏人失去生命。这对西藏事业有何帮助呢？
国际媒体很快就会失去兴趣，重复死亡没有新闻价值的（“有什么新的？”），没有哪个强大的外国政府对摇晃中国船感兴趣。随着本国正在发生的经济危机，以及西亚和北非发生的重大变化，揭露西方政府对民主和人权的虚伪；如果你认为会有更多压力施加在中国身上，那就太天真了。 在任何情况下，中国政府关注的主要是国内人民的感受。 鉴于对信息几乎全部进行审查，以及在全国广泛存在的汉族沙文主义，在很多中国人的印象中，藏族只不过是张狂的小弟弟，应该由更加先进的汉族大哥来照顾；藏人自焚事件无法将几千万被边缘化的少数民族团结起来。事实上，中国政府将得到一个机会，把藏人塑造成为不理性的宗教狂热分子。 西藏运动得到国际社会的关注的胜利将被证明得不偿失。因此，流亡领导面临困境，他们有两个选择。
利用这一抗议活动，以恢复世界各地的藏人和他们的支持者的活力，即使这意味着间接鼓励在中国境内已经遭受苦难的藏族青年的壮烈牺牲。或者，突出在中国境内的藏人受到的持续压迫；同时公开和私下里做工作，呼吁当地的藏人，为了民族的生存，要珍惜自己的生命。迄今为止，流亡政府总理洛桑森格领导下的新的政治领导层选择了前者。如此，它需要解决这一牺牲个人生命的斗争形式与达赖喇嘛中间道路的承诺之间的脱节；中间道路使用非暴力手段，寻求藏人在中华人民共和国内实施真正自治。
然而，流亡的宗教领袖必须站出来。他们应该选择第二个选项。藏传佛教第三大高级喇嘛噶玛巴，已经表达了他对政治自杀的不安。其他一些喇嘛也表达了他们的忧虑。但我们仍在等待达赖喇嘛的意见。他会同意目前政治领导层，采取声援自焚藏人的策略吗？还是会采取一个不太受欢迎，但与佛教理论兼容的立场，要求在中国境内的藏人不要一味自焚呢？ 在所有人中间，他最了解，中国不怕死亡或奄奄一息的僧人；它害怕活着的藏人。
China fears the living Tibetans – not those who set fire to themselves
The eyes of the international media may be on Tibet once again, but this wave of self-immolation will not help its people
Protest by self-immolation is a new phenomenon in Tibet. Stories of young people burning themselves in protest against the draconian policies and practices of the Chinese government are coming out of the country on almost a daily basis. Unfortunately, both the Chinese government and the Tibetan leaders in exile are responding to this human tragedy solely in terms of a blame game.
The Tibetan exile government as well as the activists ascribe self-immolations to the repressive nature of the Chinese rule that leaves Tibetans with no other option but to sacrifice their lives to remind the world of their pain. The Chinese government blames the Dalai Lama and the exiles for encouraging this form of protest to create more instability inside China and generate international sympathy. This politics of blame marshals the same old adversarial vocabulary that has been the hallmark of Sino-Tibetan relations since 1959 and has failed to achieve any accommodation so far. It certainly falls short of addressing the immediate crisis in hand – the loss of human lives due to the copycat phenomenon of self-immolation.
The fact that Tibet is back in the international news and the exiles in India and the west are galvanising their movement in solidarity with the self-immolating protesters indicates that the acts are already having some impact. But at what cost? Does any of this make the key demand of Tibetans inside Tibet – the return of the Dalai Lama and the right to be treated with dignity – closer to fruition?
Self-immolation is not nonviolent. It is, in fact, a violence against oneself. Harming one's own corporeal being is unjustifiable and goes against most interpretations of Buddhism. It certainly goes against the hard work put by the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan religious figures to equate Tibetan Buddhism and identity with nonviolence. Though violence, as much as nonviolence, was always part and parcel of Tibetan history and culture, the 14th Dalai Lama has been singularly successful in associating the Tibet cause with nonviolence. Won't his lifetime's work go waste if this novel form of political protest spreads like a wildfire? No community can exercise patience, something that nonviolent resistance demands, in the face of young men killing themselves.
Collective politics, especially at times of stress and in a context of repression, tends to become rapidly radicalised as individuals feel the pressure to perform in specific ways. Compromise becomes a bad word. And as the performance of patriotism and loyalty toward the Dalai Lama become associated with immolating oneself to protest against the Chinese rule, more Tibetan lives will be lost in the coming days. How does that benefit the Tibetan cause?
International media will soon lose interest for the repetitive deaths are not newsworthy ("what's new?") and there is no powerful foreign government interested in rocking the Chinese boat. With the ongoing economic crisis at home and major changes in west Asia and north Africa that are exposing western government's hypocrisy toward democracy and human rights, it is naive to believe that any additional pressure would be applied on China. In any case, the Chinese government's main concern is what people within China feel. Given the almost total censorship of information in the country as well as the widespread Han chauvinism that perceives Tibetans as insolent younger brothers to be taken care of by the more progressive Han Chinese majority, self-immolations will not bring about solidarity with the tens of millions of marginalised Chinese. In fact, the Chinese government will get an opportunity to portray Tibetans as religious fanatics who cannot be reasoned with. The victory of the Tibetan movement in terms of getting international attention will prove to be pyrrhic.
So the exile leadership faces a dilemma and has two options.
Should it use the protests to rejuvenate Tibetans and their supporters all over the world, even if it means indirectly encouraging the attractiveness of this heroic sacrifice for the already-suffering young Tibetans inside China? Or should it highlight the continuing oppression of Tibetans inside China but at the same time discourage self-immolation by publicly calling for, and privately working for, the Tibetans in the affected region to treasure their lives for the survival of the nation? The new political leadership underLobsang Sangay, the prime minister of the government in exile, has so far been to go for the first option.
But it needs to address the disjuncture between the commitment to the middle way of the Dalai Lama (which entails genuine autonomy for the Tibetans within the People's Republic of China and struggle to seek that through nonviolent means) and the actual reality of a struggle where individual lives are being sacrificed.
However, it is the religious leaders in exile who must take the initiative here. It is they who should go for the second option. The Karmapa, the third highest lama in Tibetan Buddhist hierarchy, has expressed his discomfort with political suicides. Other individual lamas too have expressed their disquiet. But we are still waiting for the Dalai Lama to make his views known on this. Will he go with the political leadership's strategy of solidarity with self-immolation or will he adopt a less popular but religiously compatible stance of requesting the Tibetans inside China not to indulge in self-immolation? Of all the people, he knows best that China does not fear the dead or the dying monks. It fears the living ones.
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